IAS is Here to Stay Because it Suits the Political Executive

It is not lateral recruitment but ‘back-door entry’ of retired ‘babus’ that can cause damage to the IAS.

Lateral Entry in News Again

On the day the Union Public Service Commission issued an advertisement to recruit 45 Joint Secretaries, Directors, and Deputy Secretaries across 24 Central Ministries through lateral entry on a contract basis or deputation, my mind went back to my article captioned "IAS is here to stay because it suits the political executive," published on 12 June 2018 in ThePrint. At that time, I was still in service as the Special Chief Secretary, Punjab, with over three years of residual service.

Some said that the article amounted to criticism of government policies or that I was attempting to undermine the very service to which I had belonged since 1984. However, I had simply written what I believed, and now, over six years later, as the matter resurfaces in the news and the scheme has been in operation for several years, I find that my original hypothesis is more valid than ever. It is in this context that I would like to share my old article, with minimal changes.

But first, a little backgrounder.

Implementation and Goals of the Lateral Entry Scheme

The lateral entry scheme, introduced in 2018, aimed to bring domain experts from the private sector into government departments at senior levels, specifically at the Joint Secretary and Director positions. This initiative sought to infuse fresh talent and new perspectives into the bureaucracy, addressing the shortage of IAS officers in central government roles¹, and providing specialized expertise in specific domains. The scheme was seen as a significant step toward modernizing the civil service and making it more responsive to contemporary challenges by incorporating professionals with diverse experience outside the traditional bureaucratic framework.

Outcomes, Challenges, and Government Review

Despite initial hopes, the lateral entry scheme has faced several challenges and has not delivered the transformative impact anticipated. Integration issues have emerged, with many lateral entrants struggling to adapt to the bureaucratic culture and some leaving their posts prematurely due to dissatisfaction or underutilization of their expertise. Additionally, the scheme has not significantly enhanced diversity within senior bureaucratic ranks, particularly among underrepresented groups. As a result, the government began reviewing the program in late 2023 to address these shortcomings and explore ways to better integrate lateral entrants into the civil service, ensuring their skills and expertise are effectively leveraged in policymaking.

Addressing New Issues in the Lateral Entry Scheme

While the current tranche of recruitment may have tackled some of the earlier challenges, a new issue has emerged, attracting criticism due to the absence of reservations for SC/ST and OBC candidates. The official stance is that since each position is a single post, applying the reservation policy would result in 100% reservation, which is constitutionally impermissible. With this context in mind, let’s revisit our 2018 article to explore these ongoing dynamics.

Lateral Entry— the first step to Liquidate the IAS?

The government’s notification on ‘lateral recruitment’ at the level of Joint Secretary has triggered a lively debate in bureaucratic, media, political, and academic circles over this “bold” new initiative. It has been variously viewed as a paradigm shift in “bureaucratic reforms” or a low-key introduction of the “system of spoils,” leading some to predict that this could be the beginning of the end of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS).

That the induction of merely 10 Joint Secretaries in a few key ministries at the Centre—on a contractual basis for 3-5 years—would create such a storm in a teacup was perhaps not anticipated by many.

Apprehensions have been expressed that persons with known ideological preferences may be recruited by keeping the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) out of the loop, thus creating an elite “blue-eyed” cadre of a “committed bureaucracy,” loyal to the government of the day rather than the Constitution of India—a kind of disguised “privatisation of the IAS.”

Our hypothesis here is that the existing system suits the political executive, both at the national level and in the states. Without this, the IAS would have been consigned to the archives, notwithstanding Article 310 of the Constitution and the impassioned speeches of Sardar Patel to the Constituent Assembly.

A Human Resource Pool

The IAS provides a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary human resource pool, which not only appreciates the political imperatives but also carries significant institutional memory. The so-called esprit de corps of the service helps sort out inter-departmental issues in an environment where governmental structures tend to work in silos.

More importantly, the officers are available from the very day the new government assumes office. Even if one were to have a system where a brand new set of civil servants would serve for a tenure co-terminus with the government, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would prevent the selection from being arbitrary.

A Safety Net

A permanent and “experienced” civil service also provides a kind of safety net, should the decisions of the top political executive be questioned later. The political masters can always argue that they merely went by the advice of the “experts,” thereby not only saving themselves from responsibility, accountability, and culpability but also pushing the same down the line.

Recent high-profile cases relating to the 2G spectrum, coal block allocation, and FIPB scams have revealed that even the courts tend to be more lenient towards political personalities as long as they are able to demonstrate that they merely acted on the well-considered and documented advice of senior civil servants.

Long-Term Accountability

A permanent civil servant provides both to the system and the political executive a long-term accountability, the onus of which lies squarely on the civil servant. It is not uncommon for decades-old cases to be fished out and proceedings, both criminal and departmental, to be initiated against career civil servants. No such arrangement can be put in place for short-term contractually hired “managers/experts.” A career civil servant can be “punished” in numerous ways, formal as well as informal, since he is here to stay for the long term.

Goodwill Helps

A permanent civil service also provides fertile ground for the political executive to nurture young IAS officers of the respective state cadre, who have a long innings ahead.

The goodwill generated by the first-generation politician can be reaped by the second-generation scions of the political family. Such relationships can also come in handy when the political personality is out of power. Civil servants would also tend to be accommodating, knowing well that those out in the cold today may come to power in the next elections.

Back-Door Entry Threat

One cannot assert that the IAS system of governance is the best, but the thrust of the argument is that the IAS has survived because it has been and remains eminently suitable to the political executive, which is our initial hypothesis.

The IAS is here to stay, and no privatisation, the term used for “lateral entry,” can cause it any serious damage. What may perhaps cause more harm to the IAS is the “back-door entry” of retired “babus,” who may usurp senior IAS cadre posts that eluded them while in service in a seniority-cum-merit scenario.

The other assault could come from unwarranted extensions to serving IAS officers occupying top positions, which would unjustly deprive their junior colleagues of those coveted posts at the culmination of their respective careers.

Summing Up

The ‘steel frame’ of the IAS may be under stress, but it is far from collapsing. The system has adapted and endured, not because it is the best or most efficient, but because it continues to serve the needs of the political executive effectively. As lateral entry and other reforms continue to evolve, the real threat to the IAS may come from within—from practices that undermine its meritocratic and hierarchical structure, rather than from external entrants who pose no real challenge to the enduring institution.

What I averred six years ago, is even more relevant today.

1. The Central Government attempted to address this issue by bringing in officers from other All-India Services, such as the IPS and the Indian Forest Service, as well as from other Group "A" Central Services, on central deputation at the levels of Director, Joint Secretary, and even Additional Secretary and Secretary. However, this approach did not achieve the desired outcomes.