The Changing Geometry of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran—And India’s Room for Manoeuvre
Strategy lives in the present tense; heritage whispers from the past. India’s western horizon forces both to speak at once: the map redraws itself even as old compulsions return in new dress.
The Changing Dynamics of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran—And India’s Response
The strategic triangle to India’s west is being recast in real time. Pakistan’s military leadership has stepped back into Washington’s inner circle; the Taliban regime in Kabul is increasingly treated as a transactional security interlocutor; Iran confronts renewed international pressure just as India’s hard-won access at Chabahar faces fresh headwinds. Threaded through all three is China—by roads and ports, by finance and quiet brokering—and, not far behind, a hard-bargaining White House eyeing leverage and basing. For New Delhi, whose trade talks with the United States are becalmed and whose exporters face abrupt tariff cliffs, the puzzle is how to hold strategic space while cushioning immediate economic shocks. The answer is not grandstanding but disciplined statecraft: preserve deterrence credibility, keep connectivity sovereign, and turn constraints into narrow, bankable wins.
Pakistan: the army’s primacy, Washington’s pragmatism, and the Baloch hinge
The public warmth between the White House and Pakistan’s uniformed hierarchy signals a pragmatic reset. Whatever Islamabad’s civilian churn, Washington is choosing to work the centre of gravity in Pakistan—Rawalpindi—on three files: counter-terrorism, a quieter Line of Control, and the reopening of economic spigots. The atmospherics of high-profile meetings matter because they translate into bureaucratic velocity: visas, licences, and waivers move faster when principals align. Notably, President Trump has—on almost two dozen occasions—publicly claimed that he was instrumental in securing the ceasefire underpinning Operation Sindoor, even as New Delhi has consistently maintained that no third-party mediation was involved.
The regulatory shift on Balochistan is even more consequential. By criminalising the principal insurgent formation—tightening financing, travel and procurement—Washington lowers headline risk for prospective investors eyeing Balochistan’s copper, gold and rare-earths, and gives Islamabad sharper legal tools. Yet law is not a substitute for legitimacy. Insurgency ebbs when resource-sharing is transparent, local employment is real, and coercion is more surgical than sweeping. If the Pakistani state uses the diplomatic tailwind to pursue political accommodation alongside targeted enforcement, the arc of violence can bend down. If it does not, investment will continue to price in sabotage risks.
Pakistan’s western frontier is the other pressure point. The post-withdrawal landscape has left the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with depth in Afghanistan, convulsing border districts and straining a relationship with Kabul that Islamabad once imagined it could choreograph. Riyadh’s security alignments with Pakistan offer prestige and material support but cannot plaster over geography: a porous frontier, resilient militant micro-economies, and an Afghan polity still searching for the minimum viable state.
From India’s vantage, the deterrence reset matters most. In spite of a ceasefire framework, New Delhi has demonstrated—through precise, limited-aim military and covert actions—that cross-border provocation now invites calibrated costs. The political economy of terror shrinks when success is uncertain and punishment predictable. That reality, more than communiqués, has narrowed Pakistan-based actors’ room to foment trouble in Jammu & Kashmir.
Afghanistan: Bagram’s shadow and transactional Talibanism
Afghanistan has slid from a democracy-building enterprise to an intelligence and over-the-horizon problem. The most arresting line in current U.S. thinking is a renewed interest in Bagram Air Base—prized for its location relative to both transnational terrorist networks and parts of China’s western nuclear-industrial complex. The bargain on the table is stark: if the Taliban can facilitate basing rights, air corridors or a reliable intelligence footprint, Washington will engage directly and pay in the coin Kabul values—sanctions relief, access to reserves, or incremental recognition-type gestures.
The Taliban will bargain hard. Their internal coalition requires economic crumbs to hold together; their external legitimacy requires visible deliverables to sceptical neighbours. Expect, therefore, a choreography of pilot arrangements and performance-for-relief swaps rather than a grand bargain.
India, by contrast, has kept its profile deliberately modest: humanitarian corridors, scholarships, medical aid, and back-channel liaison. This is prudent. A visible political embrace would alienate large swathes of Afghan society that remember India’s developmental role fondly, while a complete retreat would orphan past investments in people, projects and goodwill. The middle path is to rebuild presence around people and data—tele-medicine clinics, remote skilling for Afghan professionals, modular power pilots and quiet security information-sharing that protects Indian interests without laundering Taliban governance. If Washington and Kabul inch toward a Bagram-centred understanding, India should seek de-confliction protocols and intelligence de-duplication to avoid working at cross purposes.
Iran: sanctions snap-back, Chabahar’s jeopardy, and the China factor
Tehran again faces consolidated international pressure. Renewed sanctions complicate banking, shipping and technology access, tightening the screws just as regional security has turned more volatile. For India, the sharper pain point is the fading of special dispensations around the Chabahar project—the very corridor New Delhi has nurtured to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan.
Chabahar is not just a port; it is an idea: that India’s connectivity should not be hostaged to one frontier or one political season. Its value is humanitarian (a conduit for food grains and medicines into Afghanistan), strategic (a counter-weight to Gwadar), and commercial (a spine for the International North–South Transport Corridor). The recalibration of U.S. waivers does not kill the project, but it raises compliance costs and slows timelines. Meanwhile, China—less constrained by Western regimes—steps into the vacuum: deepening logistics with Iran, dangling financing, and reinforcing a Belt-and-Road arc that already binds Pakistan and, potentially, parts of Afghanistan.
India’s response should be two-handed. With one hand, keep Chabahar technically alive within the four corners of sanctions law: wall off commercial risk through special-purpose vehicles; expand clearly humanitarian lanes; ring-fence transactions via rupee-rial settlements and multilateral-agency throughput (World Food Programme, UNICEF). With the other, build redundancy: accelerate INSTC pieces that do not depend on Iranian waivers; trial bonded trucking from Caucasus gateways; and stand up dedicated freighter links into Almaty, Tashkent and Bishkek to shave days off time-to-market.
China’s through-line
Across the triangle, China is the constant. In Pakistan, sunk costs in CPEC and the promise of extensions into Afghanistan give Beijing a structural voice on security along the beltway. In Iran, discounted oil and logistics investment translate into leverage when sanctions bite. In the Gulf, China’s role in facilitating a Saudi–Iran détente bought diplomatic credit that it will cash in quietly, over time. Any U.S. attempt to re-insert itself—via Pakistan’s army, a transactional understanding with the Taliban, or sanctions manoeuvres on Iran—will be played on a chessboard that China helped lay out. India need not mirror Beijing’s playbook; it must, however, read every bilateral conversation in Islamabad, Kabul or Tehran for its Chinese subtext.
Trade headwinds with the U.S.
Strategic cooperation and trade friction can, unhelpfully, coexist. New U.S. tariff lines—steep duties on selected categories, including branded and patented pharmaceuticals—arrive just as the bilateral trade conversation has lost momentum. Even if sectoral lobbying tempers some measures, the near-term reality is price pain for Indian exporters and elevated compliance costs. Rather than chase a maximalist trade package in a protectionist season, New Delhi should focus on narrow, bankable bargains that create constituencies for relief: pharma quality-assurance compacts and supply-security commitments for carve-outs; digital-trade guardrails for clarity on data flows and cloud localisation; and critical-minerals cooperation to crowd in investment outside contested geographies.
A realistic menu for India
Guard deterrence and deny deniability. Preserve the ability to punish precisely, message calmly and contain escalation. Invest in longer-reach stand-off options, harden against drones and loitering munitions across Punjab and J&K, and keep public attribution standards scrupulously high. Deterrence works best when it is boringly predictable to adversaries.
Keep Chabahar open as a global public good. Frame it explicitly as a humanitarian and regional-integration project. Pre-commit guaranteed berth and storage for multilateral agencies; publish transparent tariff books; and invite third-country monitoring of compliance. Legally conservative execution can coexist with strategic persistence.
Build INSTC-plus redundancy. Fast-track customs interoperability with Caucasus partners; pilot green-lane protocols for perishable cargo; and underwrite limited-duration air-freight bridges to Central Asian hubs while sea-rail legs mature. The goal is not a single big ribbon-cutting but many small time-savers.
Create a sanctions-compliance backbone for MSMEs. A government-backed re-insurance window for export credit and a national helpdesk (standard clauses, live advisories, “can I ship this?” triage) will prevent over-compliance paralysis that silently destroys orders.
Quietly expand the Afghan footprint around people and data. Scholarships, tele-clinics, modular solar and cold-chain pilots, and a joint working cell on terror finance and trafficking offer leverage without endorsing Taliban governance. If a Bagram-related understanding gathers pace, seek information-sharing protocols that respect India’s equities.
Work with Washington where interests align—even in Pakistan. Share targeted, attribute-ready intelligence on specific cadres and facilitators; ask for measurable milestones (finance seizures, prosecutions, hand-overs) and time-boxed reviews. If the U.S. is investing political capital in Pakistan’s army to stabilise the west and police anti-India groups, test-and-verify rather than reflexively oppose.
Resource security without Balochistan exposure. Team with Japan, the EU and the U.S. on offtake-backed financing for copper, lithium and rare-earth processing in third countries. This hedges against a future where Western capital re-enters Balochistan at scale under a Pakistan–U.S. understanding.
Convert tariff pain into clarity. Trade narrow for certain: pharma carve-outs in exchange for verifiable quality commitments; digital-trade certainty for data-flow guardrails; critical-minerals cooperation for co-financed processing. Bank small wins that survive political mood swings.
Narrative diplomacy. In multilateral forums and Track-2s, hammer one theme: India’s western projects are public goods—food corridors, medical supply lines, and connective tissue that integrates Central Asia into world markets. Narratives do not change laws, but they influence exceptions and the temperature of enforcement.
Cautious optimism
Nothing in this landscape is easy. Pakistan’s civil–military equilibrium is contingent; Taliban internal politics remain opaque; sanctions on Iran will roil markets; and China will keep arbitraging Western hesitations. Yet there is a path for India that combines steadiness with selective audacity. Guard deterrence; keep connectivity sovereign; convert tariff shocks into narrow but durable bargains; deepen partnerships across Central Asia and with like-minded economies. India has always practised patient, interest-first diplomacy at its best—anchored in public-good projects others can sign on to. That is how New Delhi can navigate a tighter, more competitive western horizon and still make it a corridor for trade, diplomacy and strategic alignment—on India’s terms.
One-sentence summary for editors
A 1,500-word, argument-driven analysis of how shifting U.S.–Pakistan ties, transactional dealings with the Taliban, renewed pressure on Iran, and China’s through-line reshape India’s western calculus—and a practical nine-step playbook for New Delhi to protect deterrence, salvage connectivity, and extract narrow wins amid tariff and sanctions headwinds.
Author bio (≤100 words)
Karan Bir Singh Sidhu is a retired IAS officer of the Punjab cadre (1984 batch) and a policy commentator on governance, geopolitics and law. He holds an MA in Economics from the University of Manchester (UK) and a certificate in “Leaders in Development” from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He is the Founder-cum-Chief Editor of The KBS Chronicle, his daily personal newsletter. He has served as Special Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab and writes on India’s strategic posture with a focus on the Indo-Pacific and the subcontinent’s western flank.