Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Meet NSA Doval in Delhi: From Stand-off to Stability

Backed by EAM S. Jaishankar and the IFS, PM Modi keeps options open—ready to recalibrate if Trump’s 50% tariffs hold—as SR talks seek a calmer LAC and substantive détente before the 1–2 September SCO.

National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. File photo.

Author Credentials:

KBS Sidhu is a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer and former Special Chief Secretary, Punjab. He writes at the confluence of geopolitics, U.S. trade policy, and India’s evolving relationship with China, with a focus on how New Delhi can balance security imperatives at the Line of Actual Control with economic guardrails in a shifting global trade order.

Mending Fences With China — On India’s Terms

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is slated to be in New Delhi on Monday for talks with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval under the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism on the boundary question. The agenda, by all accounts, is to cool the frontier and restore predictability along the Line of Actual Control. The timing could hardly be more consequential. Even as India’s trade with China remains large—with a persistent and politically salient deficit—the United States under President Donald Trump is moving towards penal tariffs that will redirect global trade currents in unpredictable ways. India must therefore treat this diplomatic opening as a chance to mend fences with Beijing without lowering its guard—shaping a relationship that reduces risk while preserving strategic autonomy.

Why Now: The Case for a Realist Reset

The SR mechanism exists for precisely such moments. It is the highest-level channel dedicated to managing the boundary question, and it can set political parameters that guide the on-ground choreography between corps commanders and diplomats. We should use it to convert process into outcomes: from disengagement to de-escalation, and from tacit understandings to written, verifiable protocols. In parallel, Donald Trump’s tariff push creates a second-order shock to trade flows. If India does nothing, we will face a surge of diversion, circumvention and dumping pressures that could squeeze our manufacturers and widen our deficit. If we act, we can shape outcomes—tighten guardrails where needed and extract market access where possible.

AI-generated representational image.

The Trade Reality: De-Risking, Not Decoupling

A great deal of commerce still crosses our ports, and much of it is upstream to India’s growth ambitions—capital goods, components, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and electronics sub-assemblies. The deficit is a symptom of that input dependence. The disease would be to mistake de-risking for decoupling. Decoupling would raise costs, slow job creation and make India less competitive just as we are trying to scale manufacturing. De-risking, by contrast, is about reducing single-source vulnerabilities, diversifying suppliers, building resilient inventories, and steadily indigenising critical nodes of the value chain. That is a marathon, not a sprint—and it is best run under stable geopolitical weather.

The Border Imperative: Freeze, Verify, Communicate

Stability at the LAC is the bedrock on which any economic normalisation must stand. I would focus the Delhi round on four deliverables.

First, a codified “LAC stability package”. This should specify verifiable separation in sensitive pockets; transparent, synchronised patrolling calendars; a no-build moratorium for new forward infrastructure within agreed buffer zones; and standardised incident-reporting templates with time-stamped releases by both sides.

Second, layered crisis communications. Upgrade local commander hotlines from voice to secure data with shared map overlays; institute a 24×7 duty-officer hotline between foreign ministries; and create a time-bound escalation ladder that forces quicker political attention when tactical friction risks strategic spillover.

Third, joint verification practices. Where feasible, trial mirrored verification patrols and on-site checks with neutral logging (for example, mutually visible beacons or time-synced geo-location pings) that reduce room for misunderstanding.

Fourth, a calendar for de-escalation. Link phased withdrawal of troops and heavy assets to milestones in patrolling protocols and incident-free windows. The sequencing can be conservative; the point is to restore predictability and shrink the space for accidents.

The Tariff Shock From Washington: Risk and Opportunity

The emerging tariff architecture in the United States will redirect supply chains. Some flows out of China will not head to America directly; they will look for third markets—and India is too large to be ignored. The risk is obvious: re-routed goods undercutting domestic production, widening trade imbalances and creating friction at the state level where jobs are at stake. Yet there is opportunity as well. If Beijing seeks to keep access to a large and growing market like India, New Delhi can negotiate tangible wins: faster sanitary and phytosanitary clearances for Indian agri-products; mutual-recognition pathways in pharmaceuticals and medical devices; and expanded space for services exports under robust data-security undertakings. The quid pro quo is straightforward: market access where India can win, and hard guardrails where the economy is vulnerable.

A Six-Point Playbook for Delhi

1) Make the border boring again. The objective is a cold, predictable peace: no heroics, no surprises. Lock in patrol routines, verification modalities and a standing political hotline. Publish the procedures so that forces on both sides know the rules of the road.

2) Pair defensive trade instruments with offensive goals. Strengthen anti-circumvention protocols at customs; expand data-sharing and end-use audits in electronics, solar components and chemicals; and be ready with swift, rules-based safeguards. But in the same breath, table specific tariff-line asks: more agricultural lines cleared, time-bound approvals for select generics and vaccines, and a pilot window for professional services delivery.

3) Create a “clean-room” for investment. Keep national-security filters for land-border countries intact in core networks, critical infrastructure and high-end compute. At the same time, carve out a fast-track lane for non-sensitive greenfield investments where India needs capital and capability—machinery, food-processing equipment, textiles technology, auto ancillaries. Condition approvals on local value addition, R&D commitments and transparent supply-chain disclosures.

4) Technology with trip-wires. Allow standards dialogue, testing and certification cooperation that can lower costs for Indian firms. But preserve hard exclusions in telecom core, critical energy systems, strategic minerals processing and advanced semiconductors. The message is simple: collaborate where it is safe and useful; cordon off where it is not.

5) Mobility and connectivity. Restore direct flights at scale; expand multi-entry business visas; and restart cultural and academic exchanges. Normal human contact is the cheapest confidence-building measure. A modest expansion of air capacity and visa validity can do more to thaw perceptions than a dozen communiqués.

6) Multilateral pragmatism. Use platforms where both sides sit—whether regional groupings or development banks—to pilot narrow cooperation: disaster-relief drills, public-health surveillance, and narcotics-precursor control. Keep sensitive issues bilateral; pick plurilateral lanes for the uncontroversial, useful stuff.

Red Lines That Must Not Blur

Mending fences is not an invitation to amnesia. India must remain unmoved on the core principles that have guided our stance since 2020. There is no “business as usual” if the border heats up; verification is non-negotiable; and all interim arrangements are to be judged by one test—do they make the frontier more peaceful and predictable? On technology, we must resist the seduction of cheap kit where the long-term costs are strategic: backdoors, standards lock-in, dependency and leverage. On investment, transparency and reciprocity should be the watchwords. And on trade, we should not be spooked by the deficit headline into protectionist reflexes that harm our own manufacturers; rather, we should use the deficit as a spur to build capability and bargaining leverage.

State Capacity: The Unsung Variable

None of this works without a capable Indian state at the ports, at standards bodies and in the negotiating room. Customs needs better data pipes and risk-profiling; regulators need clearer, faster approval pathways; trade negotiators need live dashboards showing sectoral pain points and export prospects; and industry needs predictable rules, not policy whiplash. A coherent India strategy for China requires a coherent India strategy inside India: fewer discretionary levers, more digitised rules, and institutional memory that outlasts personnel changes.

What Success Would Look Like Next Week

We should judge the Wang–Doval round by three practical outcomes. First, a written SR-level guidance that locks in synchronised patrolling, crisis hotlines and verification routines for the coming season. Second, a time-sequenced de-escalation calendar—conservative, conditional and transparent—that pulls heavy assets back in stages tied to incident-free windows. Third, a joint trade note that couples anti-circumvention measures with the first tranche of Indian market-access gains in agri, pharma and services. These are not grand bargains; they are low-drama, high-impact steps that accumulate into normalcy.

Politics Without Illusions

It is tempting to reduce India–China policy to slogans: “stand firm” on one extreme, “embrace trade” on the other. Neither is a strategy. Standing firm without a stabilisation plan risks perpetual brinkmanship; embracing trade without guardrails risks strategic dependence. The middle path is not mushy; it is muscular. It says: we will cooperate where interests overlap, compete where they do not, and confront where we must—all the while keeping the border quiet and the rules clear. That is the essence of strategic autonomy.

A Word on the United States

The United States will remain a critical partner for India across technology, defence, finance and the diaspora. But the present tariff turn is a reminder that American domestic politics can—at times—work at cross-purposes with India’s immediate commercial interests. A functional channel with Beijing does not dilute our partnership with Washington; it strengthens it. Options are power. When India has a working line to both Beijing and Washington, it can say “yes” or “no” on the merits, not out of compulsion.

The Road Ahead: Hard-Nosed Engagement

A reset with China need not be romantic, and it must not be naïve. It should be transactional, verifiable and revocable. The border must remain peaceful and predictable; trade must be balanced by enforceable guardrails and real market-access wins; investment must flow into clean rooms, not critical networks; and technology cooperation must proceed behind clearly marked trip-wires. If Beijing meets these tests, normalisation can advance. If not, India should pause, tighten the screws where necessary, and keep building domestic capacity.

Cautious Optimism

we are cautiously optimistic about the week ahead. The SR mechanism provides a structured lane to turn atmospherics into arrangements and arrangements into habits. It would be naïve, however, to assume that Prime Minister Modi is literally wedded to the American pole; India’s membership of the Quad has never precluded hedging or recalibration. If President Trump remains obdurate on punitive 50% tariffs, Mr Modi has both the courage and the pragmatism to change gears and rebalance accordingly. With the able assistance of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and a thoroughly professional diplomatic corps under the aegis of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Foreign Service, India is well positioned to navigate turbulent waters.

This visit may well be the prelude to finalising an India–China détente—so that PM Modi’s planned visit to China on 1–2 September for the SCO Summit is not a headline-grabber alone but a platform for substantive movement, lifting the bilateral ties between two Asian giants—both long scarred by colonialism and imperialism—into a new orbital. We will not solve the boundary overnight, nor erase the trade imbalance in a season. But if we can make the border boring, tighten our economic guardrails, and secure a few concrete wins for Indian producers and workers, we will have nudged the relationship out of crisis management and into managed competition. That is not a grand reconciliation; it is a measured step towards stability. For the moment, that is exactly what India needs—and it is reason enough for cautious optimism.