Challenging the Constitutional Validity of BBMB: A Legal Path Beyond Political Posturing
Farmers’ unions, former civil servants, retired irrigation engineers, or even public-spirited NGOs can invoke Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution. Such litigation does not require state sanction.
About the Author
Karan Bir Singh Sidhu is a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer with nearly four decades of distinguished public service. Over the course of his career, he has held several pivotal assignments in Punjab, including serving as Special Chief Secretary and Principal Secretary, Irrigation. His extensive administrative experience, particularly in water resource governance and inter-state disputes, informs his deep engagement with issues of federalism, constitutional law, and Punjab’s inalienable riparian rights.
Challenging the Constitutional Validity of BBMB:
1. A Truncated Birth and the Premature Triplets of Disempowerment
Punjab’s river–water story began on 1 November 1966—the very day Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir took oath as the first Chief Minister of the re-organised, rather truncated and trifurcated state. While the Shiromani Akali Dal and the proponents of the Punjabi Suba Morcha celebrated their hard-fought linguistic victory and the state slipped into partial jubilation, few paused to read the fine print. Concealed in the dense legalese of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, were the premature triplets of disempowerment—Sections 78, 79, and 80—that gave statutory birth to a centralised structure now known as the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB).
The BBMB would eventually usurp Punjab’s legitimate control over its irrigation and hydroelectric assets, originally built by undivided Punjab’s sweat and foresight. What was framed as administrative continuity became constitutional subversion, reducing Punjab to a subordinate stakeholder in its own river systems. The BBMB's creation, coupled with the Centre’s overreach, laid the foundation for decades of conflict, spawning disputes, agitations, political opportunism, and even bloodshed over water sharing. Yet, at its inception, neither Musafir nor the fledgling Assembly, nor any political party, had any effective say in resisting this arrangement. Thus began a long and continuing tale of federal imbalance and institutionalised injustice—narrated through dam gates, courtrooms, and press conferences ever since.
2. Seeds of Central Command: The 1976 Notification under Giani Zail Singh
Fast-forward to 24 March 1976. The Union Power Ministry, with Congress Chief Minister Giani Zail Singh in office, unilaterally “re-allocated” Ravi–Beas water and converted the Bhakra Management Board into the far stronger Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB). At that moment no dam existed on the Ravi—Ranjit Sagar (Thein) would break ground only in 1981—and barely 0.9 MAF of Ravi water was being shunted into the Beas each year through the 10,000-cusec Madhopur–Beas link canal built in 1955-57. Yet the notification treated the river as an already harnessed surplus and gutted Punjab’s administrative control, even as its own Cabinet could do little more than register helpless protest, the record of which is not now available in official records.
3. The Suit That Wasn’t: Badal’s 1979 Article 131 Challenge
Shiromani Akali Dal stalwart Parkash Singh Badal revived Punjab’s claim in Suit No. 2 of 1979, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 78 and the 1976 central law. The Supreme Court registered the plea—but, in 1981, political compulsions forced Badal’s successor, from the Congress Party, lead by Darbara Singh as the Chief Minister, to withdraw it. A golden constitutional opening was lost.
4. The 1981 Tripartite Accord under Darbara Singh
Congress Chief Minister Darbara Singh also inked the tripartite accord of 31 December 1981—in the presence of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and his Haryana and Rajasthan counterparts—pledging to dig the Sutlej–Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal and to honour and guarantee the contentious 1976 water-sharing formula. The agreement gift-wrapped a festering dispute in glossy political cellophane, yet it won neither popular backing nor a formal vote in the Punjab Assembly. Worse, the law-and-order climate inside the state deteriorated so rapidly that Indira Gandhi invoked Article 356 less than two years later, dismissing Darbara Singh’s own Congress ministry and imposing President’s Rule on 6 October 1983—an extraordinary instance of a party sacking its own government amid spiralling unrest.
4A. Broken Promises and Blood-Stained Waters: A Chronology of Neglect (1984–2002)
The legacy of Punjab’s water disputes is deeply intertwined with the traumatic political history of the state, particularly from the mid-1980s onwards. The most egregious storming of the Golden Temple at Amritsar during Operation Blue Star in June 1984, followed by the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31st October 1984, left behind not just emotional scars, but also a political void that shaped the discourse around Punjab's rights—including river waters.
A flicker of hope emerged with the Rajiv–Longowal Accord, inked on July 24, 1985, which sought to address, among other things, Punjab’s legitimate grievances, including the sharing of river waters and the resolution of territorial disputes. However, that glimmer was short-lived. The subsequent assassination of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the key signatory from Punjab, and the volatile political environment led to piecemeal, nay broken and inchoate, implementation, especially on water-related provisions and transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab.
Despite elections being held and Surjit Singh Barnala assuming office as Chief Minister, work on the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal began in earnest but came to a halt when top engineers were gunned down by militants, leading to an atmosphere of fear and paralysis. The subsequent President’s Rule period (1987–1992) did little to revive or resolve the water crisis.
From 1992 to 1997, Punjab witnessed three successive Congress Chief Ministers—Beant Singh, Harcharan Singh Brar, and Rajinder Kaur Bhattal. Beant Singh, who played a key role in reviving development in a post-militancy Punjab, did place the Thein Dam (Ranjit Sagar Dam) construction on the River Ravi high on his government’s priority list. Yet, despite this infrastructural push, no substantive headway was made on the legal or political fronts regarding inter-state water disputes or the larger constitutional challenges linked to Punjab’s river rights. Beant Singh was assassinated on 31st August 1995, and during this five-year span, the momentum required to assert Punjab's legal claims remained conspicuously absent.
Even when Parkash Singh Badal returned to power in 1997, vowing to sacrifice everything to protect Punjab’s water, his government from 1997 to 2002 remained rhetorically defiant but functionally inactive. Despite emotionally charged statements, no meaningful constitutional or legal challenges were mounted to contest the status quo imposed by central statutes or BBMB’s composition.
In hindsight, this period marked a continuation of political tokenism without tangible legal confrontation, leaving Punjab’s water rights perpetually compromised and procedurally unchallenged.
5. Amarinder Singh’s Half-Step: The 2004 Termination Act
Captain Amarinder Singh took a bold yet brittle route by enacting the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, aimed at unilaterally annulling the tripartite water-sharing agreement of 1981. The move was intended as a decisive assertion of Punjab’s water rights, but it quickly ran into constitutional headwinds. The Union Government responded by invoking a Presidential Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution, seeking the opinion of the Supreme Court on the Act’s validity.
5A. Revenue Minister-FCR Rear Guard Action of November 2016
In November 2016, the Supreme Court rendered its advisory opinion, declaring the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 to be unconstitutional. The verdict came at a politically sensitive time—Parkash Singh Badal was once again Chief Minister, and the 2017 Vidhan Sabha elections were just months away. The move to enact the 2004 Act, initiated by Captain Amarinder Singh during his earlier tenure, was undoubtedly politically bold and arguably well-intentioned, but ultimately it proved legally untenable and strategically isolated. It lacked the necessary judicial foresight, as well as broad-based political consensus, to survive constitutional scrutiny.
At the time of the Court's opinion, Bikram Singh Majithia was serving as Punjab’s Revenue Minister, and the author of this article, KBS Sidhu, held the office of Financial Commissioner Revenue (FCR). This administrative positioning placed the author at the institutional crossroads of legal, political, and land-related strategy, providing a unique vantage point to observe—and respond to—the unfolding implications of the verdict. The experience shaped both the constitutional understanding and operational response that would help Punjab tactically delay the SYL canal’s execution, even as the legal battle continued to linger in the corridors of the Supreme Court
How Punjab averted the immediate operational fallout from the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion in November 2016 has been documented in an exclusive video recorded by us, offering rare insights into the legal, political, and administrative manoeuvring that followed. In a bold—and arguably audacious—move, the Punjab Government issued a notification returning the SYL-acquired land to its original owners, effectively out-manoeuvring Haryana and neutralising the immediate implications of the Apex Court’s opinion.
Notably, this strategic act of defiance has not yet been judicially set aside, and the SYL issue continues to remain entangled in the Supreme Court, much to Haryana’s frustration. The neighbouring state had anticipated swift enforcement following the Apex Court’s unanimous advisory opinion in November 2016, but Punjab’s unexpected legal riposte has kept the dispute in limbo—delaying the canal’s construction while reigniting debates over federal limits and land restitution.
6. Rule-Tweak Politics: Channi, Mann and the 2022 Storm
The Union’s February 2022 amendment opening BBMB’s technical posts to “outsiders” triggered outrage from Chief Minister Charanjit Singh Channi, then in poll-season. Within weeks Bhagwant Mann took office and promised purposive litigation—but the central rules remain in place, and Haryana’s nominee still sits on the BBMB Board, as Member Irrigation. Symbolism again outpaced substantive relief.
7. Flashpoints 2025: Police at the Dam-Gates
May 2025 witnessed the BBMB suing Punjab in the Punjab and Haryana High Court after CM Bhagwant Mann boldly deployed state police at Nangal head-works to block an “extra” 8,500 cusecs to Haryana. Punjab counter-filed, calling BBMB meetings “institutional bullying”. The honorable Punjab and Haryana High Court Judges now juggle contempt pleas while the core vires issue—whether BBMB itself is constitutional—remains untouched.
8. Federal Fault Lines in Law: Two Doctrinal Chinks in the Armour
The legal foundations of BBMB’s control over Punjab’s rivers rest on shaky constitutional ground, and two key doctrines offer fertile ground for a fresh judicial challenge:
Legislative Competence (Entry 56, Union List): Under the Constitution, the Union may legislate on inter-State rivers only after issuing a formal declaration in Parliament, explicitly stating that such regulation is "in the public interest." No such declaration exists for the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB). This omission strips the Centre of the constitutional authority it claims to wield, rendering its administrative machinery ultra vires.
Structural Federalism and the Equality of States: Recent jurisprudence by the Supreme Court has affirmed the principle of co-equal federalism, emphasising that States cannot be reduced to administrative outposts of the Union. A Union-dominated Board—with officers appointed and controlled by Delhi—running water projects entirely located within Punjab’s territorial jurisdiction is an affront to this evolving federal ethos. BBMB, as presently structured, violates the spirit of the Constitution by centralising control over a State’s vital natural resource without democratic accountability.
9. A Citizen’s Charter for Litigation: From Victimhood to Vigilance
Crucially, constitutional challenges are not barred by limitation periods. This opens the door for any aggrieved citizen of Punjab, or an organised body such as farmers’ unions, retired irrigation engineers, ex-service personnel, or even public-spirited NGOs, to invoke Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution. Such litigation need not wait for government sanction.
Potential prayers for relief may include:
A judicial stay on BBMB’s administrative and non-maintenance decisions that prejudice Punjab's interest;
A direction for the constitution of a neutral, independent river waters tribunal with representation from riparian stakeholders;
A court-monitored audit of reservoir releases, data disclosures, and maintenance backlogs, ensuring transparency and real-time accountability;
A declaration striking down Union overreach where constitutional and federal limits are transgressed.
This is not just legal activism—it is constitutional reclamation.
10. Equal-Opportunity Indictment: All Parties, One Betrayal
No political party in Punjab emerges untarnished in the decades-long saga of abdicated riparian rights:
Indian National Congress: Authored the Punjab Reorganisation Act (1966) and the controversial 1976 Notification reallocating river waters. Signed the 1981 tripartite agreement—without legislative ratification—and later withdrew the State's suit from the Supreme Court, abandoning the legal battlefield altogether.
Shiromani Akali Dal: Though Shiromani Akali Dal has consistently projected itself as the staunch defender of Punjab’s riparian rights, its actions tell a different story. During the tenure of Chief Minister Darbara Singh, the State withdrew a pivotal suit challenging water diversion. Despite being in power for two full terms thereafter (1997–2002 and 2007–2017), Parkash Singh Badal’s government never refiled the case, missing a critical opportunity to legally contest Punjab’s diminishing control over its rivers. This prolonged silence appears to have been a deliberate political compromise to preserve coalition stability with the BJP at the Centre.
Ironically, it was under Akali leadership itself that the SYL Canal was further legitimised—with the party signing the Rajiv–Longowal Accord in 1985, which explicitly accepted the canal’s construction. Subsequently, during Surjit Singh Barnala’s regime, land acquisition was fast-tracked and construction activity was expedited, further deepening Punjab’s entanglement in the inter-state water-sharing web.
In effect, the Akali Dal’s rhetorical opposition has rarely translated into sustained legal or administrative action, raising serious questions about its commitment to safeguarding Punjab’s sovereign and constitutional interests in river water distribution.
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): A party that champions cooperative federalism in rhetoric, yet has presided over BBMB’s functional expansion and the dilution of Punjab’s role in Board decision-making.
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP): Despite lambasting its predecessors, AAP has so far avoided initiating a fresh suit under Article 131 of the Constitution, which remains Punjab’s strongest weapon to challenge federal injustice.
Each of these parties has, in one form or another, either bartered away or failed to vigorously defend Punjab’s sovereign rights—sacrificing long-term interests at the altar of short-term optics and political expediency.
11. From Dharna to Doctrine: The Course Ahead
A dharna at the dam may satisfy the evening news cycle—but a writ in the Supreme Court has the power to reshape federal jurisprudence. If Punjab’s political and civil society actors remain mired in protest politics, without transitioning to principled, precision-targeted litigation, BBMB will continue to function as the Centre’s sluice gate—not just on Punjab’s waters, but on its autonomy and constitutional dignity.
If no one else steps forward, I shall do so in my individual capacity.
It is time to transform indignation into intervention, and to mobilise legal doctrine—not merely moral outrage—in defence of Punjab’s inalienable water and riparian rights. Only through principled, constitutional action can the silent erosion of the State’s sovereignty be not just arrested, but irreversibly reversed.
Key Sources (click)
First post-reorganisation CM G. G. S. Musafir (1966-67) en.wikipedia.org
Zail Singh tenure (1972-77) and Congress rule en.wikipedia.org
Parkash Singh Badal’s second ministry (1977-80) en.wikipedia.org
Darbara Singh as CM during 1981 accord en.wikipedia.org
Suit No. 2 of 1979 & 24-3-1976 order details casemine.com
Captain Amarinder Singh (2002-07) & 2004 Act context en.wikipedia.org
Presidential Reference on 2004 Act (SC opinion) scconline.com
Charanjit Singh Channi’s 2021-22 tenure en.wikipedia.org
Bhagwant Mann sworn in on 16 Mar 2022 en.wikipedia.org
2022 BBMB rule-change controversy tribuneindia.com
2025 High-Court clash over Nangal dam police row tribuneindia.com